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HAVE WE MADE IT? INVESTIGATING VALUE-CREATING 
STRATEGIES IN EARLY INTERNATIONALIZING 
VENTURES 
 
 
Romeo V. Turcan, Aalborg University, Denmark 
Anita Juho, Oulu University, Finland 
ABSTRACT 
The extant research on early internationalizing ventures focuses primarily on these ventures’ start-
up phase or their initial internationalization. Scarce attention is paid to how these ventures grow, if 
at all, beyond their start-up phase or initial internationalization phase. This paper explores how 
international new ventures transition from internationalizing phase to being international phase 
and whether they actually made-it to that phase. Understanding whether and how these ventures 
reach their made-it point would contribute to our understanding of how early internationalization 
affect venture’s survival and growth. 
INTRODUCTION 
The international entrepreneurship research was triggered by atypical behavior of 
international new ventures (INVs) that seek profits from international activities right from their 
inception or immediately after (Oviatt & McDougall, 1994). Since its inception, the research in 
international entrepreneurship has focused mainly on how and why INVs internationalize early on 
(Jones & Coviello, 2005; Jones, Coviello & Tang, 2011). To date, there has been hardly any 
research regarding the issue of continuing corporate growth in these INVs beyond their emergence 
phase or initial internationalization. The evolutionary patterns of INVs are not well understood 
(Bingham, 2009; Sleuwaegen & Onkelinx, 2014). Little is known as to how early 
internationalization affect organizational survival and growth (Zahra, 2005; Sapienza, Autio, 
George & Zahra, 2006), or how INVs transition from internationalizing phase to having 
internationalized phase or even whether they actually made-it to that phase.  
In this paper we explore how and whether INVs made-it beyond their emergence phase, 
aiming to generate early theoretical constructs to guide international entrepreneurship research in 
this substantive area. We define made-it point in INVs as an entrepreneurial threshold whereby 
these INVs undergo “a transition from the emergence to the professional management stage” 
(Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004, p. 41). At the same time, we view made-it point as a process of 
emergence of entrepreneurial threshold – a process that implies “…the creation of a new 
conceptualization, not always conscious, within which the entrepreneur’s organizing is re-
contextualized” (Lichtenstein, Dooley & Lumpkin, 2006, p. 169).  
Through an inductive theory building research, we investigate how and whether INVs made-it 
beyond the start-up phase or initial internationalization. The focus is on which value-creating 
activities entrepreneurs pursue that are aimed to achieve a threshold level of practiced activity – 
made-it point – possibly, leading up to a steady state of the venture for the first time. 
Understanding whether and how INVs reach their made-it points would contribute to our 
understanding of how early internationalization affect organizational survival and growth. 
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
Theoretically, we ground the paper within the dynamic capabilities view of the firm 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Sapienza et al., 2006; Winter, 2003; Zahra, Sapienza & Davidsson, 
2006). To get to a made-it point or pass the entrepreneurial threshold, entrepreneurs constantly 
construct, re-construct, and de-construct the way they conceptualize their ventures. Such iterations 
are “…punctuated, coordinated shift[s] in multiple modes of entrepreneurial organizing at virtually 
the same time, which generate a qualitatively different state – a new identity – within the nascent 
venture” (Lichtenstein et al., 2006, p. 154). These iterations are part of organizational and strategic 
routines – dynamic capabilities – by which entrepreneurs alter their ventures’ organizational 
gestalt to generate new value-creating strategies (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). We define 
organizational gestalt consisting of mutually supportive organizational system elements combined 
with appropriate resources and behavioral patterns (Covin & Slevin, 1997). 
The extant research on dynamic capabilities has focused chiefly on established companies, 
whereas research on post-entry dynamic capabilities in new ventures is relatively scant (Zahra et 
al. 2006; for exception see e.g., Autio, George & Alexy, 2011; Bingham, 2009; Lichtenstein et al., 
2006). We view dynamic capabilities as a venture’s capacity to reconfigure its organizational 
gestalt in order to adapt to its environment (Sapienza et al., 2006). The literature differentiates 
between two types of capabilities: substantive and dynamic (Winter, 2003; Zahra et al. 2006). 
Substantive capability refers to venture’s ability to solve a problem or produce a desired output, be 
this tangible or intangible; whereas dynamic capability refers to venture’s ability to change and 
reconfigure substantive capabilities. In the context of INVs, it could be expected for these ventures 
to have substantive capabilities, e.g., how to develop a software program, but rather lack dynamic 
capabilities, e.g., how to change the way this program is developed in order to meet new and 
constantly changing customers’ needs. Consequently, Zahra et al. (2006) suggest linking these two 
types of capabilities to ability rather than performance, and further suggest making explicit the 
role of decision-makers in enacting and directing such capabilities. 
For a capability, i.e., a routine, to become established, it must have reached some threshold 
level of practiced activity (Helfat & Peteraf 2003; Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004). The primary 
methods for discovering or developing dynamic capabilities are through trial-and-error, 
improvisation and imitation (Autio et al., 2010; Zahra et al., 2006). We define these methods as 
strategic experimentation that is “…a series of trial and error changes pursued along various 
dimensions of strategy, over a relatively short period of time, in an effort to identify and establish 
a viable basis for competing” (Nicholls-Nixon, Cooper & Woo, 2000, p. 496). Compared to 
established organizations that have well-established capabilities, which these organizations may 
modify, new ventures shall merely experiment with their organizational gestalt in order to create 
new dynamic capabilities for the first time (Autio et al., 2011). Entrepreneurs experiment with 
their ventures to create value at different levels of the venture by acquiring, shedding, integrating, 
and recombining resources to generate new value-creating strategies (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). 
Lichtenstein et al. (2006) found that in the process of emergence, entrepreneurs experiment with 
their young venture – organizational gestalt – at three levels: goal (vision), decision (strategic), 
and behavioral (tactical), and create, re-create, conceptualize and re-conceptualize, contextualize 
and re-contextualize respective activities at each level. An entrepreneur experiments: at the first 
level, with the concept of the venture that is organized around the opportunity s/he pursues; at the 
second level, with strategic and functional related decision, actions and interventions; and at the 
third level, with timing of enacting specific events. 
For example, at the first level, entrepreneurs may improvise with opportunity selection to take 
advantage of various emerging foreign market entry opportunities (Bingham, 2009). However, as 
Bingham (2009) warns, more improvisation in opportunity selection may result in less successful 
country entries since it makes opportunity selection inefficient and incoherent. On the other hand, 
according to Bingham (2009), less improvisation mainly reduces distracting, short-term behavior; 
improves organizational learning; and simplifies complexities associated with accumulating 
heterogeneous experience. At the second level, entrepreneurs improvise with opportunity 
execution. Here, according to Bingham (2009), more improvisation is beneficial for opportunity 
execution as it allows for more flexibility to improvise and helps avoid failure traps and in turn 
escalation of commitment to a failing course of action. As for the timing of acquiring and enacting 
specific capabilities, Bingham (2009, p. 342) emphasizes the importance of sequencing as the two 
phases of improvisation are “…intimately interconnected”. Entrepreneurs may also experiment 
with market-managing capabilities and market-creating capabilities (Holcomb, Hitt, Ireland, & 
Certo, 2007) in order to create value. Former value-creating strategies are value-enabling as they 
exploit existing product-market positions and affect current performance of the new venture by 
focusing on existing, known operating routines. The latter ones are value-enhancing as they are 
directed towards influencing the performance of a new venture in the future by altering new 
venture’s scale and scope (e.g., developing new products and entering new geographic markets).  
In new ventures such as INVs, dynamic capabilities are seen as simple, experiential, unstable 
processes that rely on quickly created knowledge and iterative execution to produce adaptive, but 
unpredictable outcomes (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). In a new venture, it will take several 
iterations for a dynamic capability to emerge, get established and create value. Zahra at al. (2006) 
cautions that high number of iterations to change and improve a dynamic capability inevitably 
result in high number of failed experiments that in turn may “…damage a new venture’s 
credibility and even lead to its demise” (p. 950). In this regard, Zahra at al. (2006) suggest that the 
emergence and establishment of dynamic capabilities are not necessarily associated with higher 
performance, despite the fact that dynamic capabilities sustain a new venture’s competitive 
advantage especially in complex, uncertain and volatile external environments. In the same vein, 
Bingham (2009) demonstrated that firms that decrease improvisation in opportunity selection but 
increase improvisation in opportunity execution are more successful in foreign market entries.  
In the context of our research, (strategic) experimentation, as a theoretical construct, may 
explain the process of emergence and establishment of dynamic capabilities. As Zahra (2005, p. 
24) argues, “Experimentation is essential for INVs to discover the winning business model and 
market recipe. Openness to this sort of experimentation is a must”. In this paper, we are interested 
in exploring how and whether INVs made-it beyond their startup phase, which experiments 
entrepreneurs conduct in order to achieve a steady state of the venture, as well as in exploring 
critical events and incidents that contribute to this process.  
METHOD 
Given scarcity of theoretical understanding and empirical evidence in this substantive area of 
research, we adopted a multiple-case study methodology for the purpose of theory building (Dyer 
& Wilkins, 1991). Following the intensity sampling strategy, we purposefully selected 
information-rich, but not extreme cases (Miles & Huberman, 1994). We identified two case 
companies on the basis of developed selection criteria. The case companies are small, high-
technology companies located in the Oulu ICT cluster in Finland. The companies started up 
sometime in 2006 or 2007, had internationalized rapidly, within 3 years after their inception, and 
were in business at the time of the research. The emergence period is a five or six year period from 
the moment of the new venture inception (Cesinger, Fink, Madsen & Kraus, 2012; Coviello & 
Jones, 2004). In Table 1, we provide a summary of growth data of case companies.  
Data Collection 
We employed critical incident technique to collect and analyze the data. Critical incident 
technique has its origins in the research undertaken by Flanagan (1954), and we define it herein as 
“...a qualitative interview procedure that facilitates the investigation of significant occurrences 
(events, incidents, processes or issues) identified by respondents, the way they are managed, and 
the outcomes in terms of perceived effects” (Chell, 1998, p. 56). We consider an event or an 
incident as being critical when it deviates significantly, either positively or negatively, from what 
is normal or expected (Edvardsson, 1992). We initially collected unobtrusive data in the form of 
running records and mass-media news reports from the inception of case companies, and created 
respective databases. We interviewed in depth key decision makers of case companies, namely 
their co-founders and CEOs. The interviews were semi-structured in the form of guided 
conversations, lasted on average sixty minutes, were recorded with interviewees’ permissions, and 
transcribed verbatim immediately after. For confidentiality reasons, interviewees’ and companies’ 
names are disguised throughout the paper. 
Data Analysis 
Data pertinent to each case were coded in an iterative manner, working back and forth 
between theory, emerging patterns and data. Quotes from interviews and examples from 
unobtrusive data are used extensively to illustrate the events, incidents, processes and issues that 
had, to various degrees, an impact on the process of emergence and establishment of made-it 
points (Pratt, 2008). We followed critical incident technique guidelines for data analysis. We 
initially identified and described critical incidents for the case companies. In Appendix 1 and 2, 
employing critical event chart (Miles & Huberman, 1994), we present the chronological flow of 
critical events of the case companies. We then focused on similarities and differences between the 
cases and chose a frame of reference to more accurately classify and analyze the data. Made-it 
point – whether achieved or not – was chosen as an initial frame of reference. Entrepreneur level 
and company level were the other frames of reference that emerged during data analysis. The next 
step in data analysis is category or concept formulation, which represents an induction of 
categories from the basic data in the form of incidents (Flanagan, 1954). During this process, we 
moved from open codes to theoretical codes. The last step in data analysis according to critical 
incident technique is to determine the most appropriate level of specificity-generality to use in 
reporting the data.  
FINDINGS 
In this section we present the emergent constructs related to value-creating strategies, which 
steer towards made-it points. Grounded in data, the following constructs emerged related to value 
creation: tensions, experimentation, and legitimacy lies. These findings are presented below. 
Tensions 
Our analysis suggests that tensions in the organizational gestalt fuel entrepreneurs’ 
experimentation efforts. As part of theoretical coding, we defined tension as a relationship 
between ideas or qualities with conflicting demands or implications (see e.g., Macmillan 
dictionary). We observed such tensions at the various levels of a venture, e.g., organizational, 
business model and operational. At organizational level, over the years, Soft-Kode owners were 
struggling to optimize the ownership structure of their venture: be this a partnership, joint venture, 
or a holding. As of today, however, just over 5 years after the creation of the holding, Soft-Kode 
owners have realized that such holding structure is not optimal and they consider changing the 
organizational ownership structure. As one of Soft-Kode owners explained: 
“Was it wise to create that holding? Although it was fun at the beginning to build it, it 
actually cost us a lot of money. We are now thinking to break everything down – to 
simplify the companies, having shareholders as private persons rather companies or 
institutions – thus allowing us to make decisions lot easier, rather to have a too lengthy 
decision process” – Soft-Kode CEO/co-owner.  
In the same vein, Soft-Med owners had conflicting views over the ownership structure when it 
came to decide to accept or not venture funding. The tension was between “…freedom to do 
things” as one of co-owners said, and the risk of getting bankrupt due to lack of funding. Given 
the nature of the tension, Soft-Med owners found themselves enslaved rather than in a happy 
marriage (Turcan, 2008). As Soft-Med CEO/co-owner mentioned:     
“What I would change relates to how much power I keep to myself. Clearly, without an 
investment I would not be able to make it so fast and scale [our venture] up in those 
timelines. If I were more jealous when it came to power, nobody would have turned to me 
to scale [the venture] up” – Soft-Med CEO/co-owner.  
At the business model level, the entrepreneurs of both ventures were struggling to identify 
their ventures’ business propositions to the market. It was interesting to observe that these tensions 
were persistent despite the existence of substantive capabilities such as experience and knowledge 
in project-based software development, R&D and prototyping; in the case of Soft-Kode, this 
tension is still there. As entrepreneurs explained:  
“Nowadays we have not been able to define what we are doing: are we selling projects, 
or resources? We were never able to define which one is the way to go or should we do 
both and how to market them and how to differ in the market with these two products or 
these two ways of doing business and which one would be better” – Soft-Kode co-owner. 
“First ideas we had were to sell via doctors and clinics. But we did understand this route 
is more time and money consuming… We decided to be quite unique and take our 
product straight to the customers. Actually, we not selling a product, we are selling a 
science” – Soft-Med CEO/co-owner.  
At the operational level, entrepreneurs’ major concerns were how to ensure the quality of the 
process of the product development or how to scale up their businesses much faster. In this, they 
faced the dilemma for example between outsourcing and insourcing or between traditional 
marketing and social media marketing. These types of tensions are exemplified below:    
“In Vietnam we hit the same tree [as in Bangladesh] when the partner there lost interest 
in us as they accepted orders from bigger companies. After such incidents, we decided 
that the only way to continue was to own the developers and thus control everything that 
is related to the process of software development – otherwise it is hard to keep the 
deadlines whatever we promise to the customers. In order to ensure the quality of the 
product we have to control the whole process” – Soft-Kode CEO/co-owner.  
“I even do not like the idea to make marketing with money; now with the current 
technology, our product could be very easily peer-reviewed by our and other customers, 
bloggers, and everybody. Anything marketed with money looks like a lie... you should be 
able to deliver your message without money as this is the message people will believe in” 
– Soft-Med CEO/co-owner. 
Experimentation 
Experimentation was identified as a means that entrepreneurs employ to create value in their 
ventures. For the purpose of theoretical coding, building on Covin & Slevin (1997) and Nicholls-
Nixon et al. (2000, p. 496) we defined experimentation as a “series of trial and error changes 
pursued along various dimensions of [organizational gestalt], over a relatively short period of 
time, in an effort to identify and establish a viable basis for competing”. Entrepreneurs were 
experimenting with the dimensions of organizational gestalt at various levels in order to reach a 
threshold of entrepreneurial activity – made-it point.  
At the goal or vision level (Lichtenstein et al., 2006), entrepreneurs were improvising with 
opportunity selection (Bingham, 2009) in order to single out the most profitable opportunity to 
pursue and design a corresponding business model to take advantage of that opportunity. The 
difference in this process between the two ventures was timing of improvisation. The owners of 
Soft-Kode were experimenting with all identified opportunities concurrently. Whereas the owners 
of Soft-Med started improvising when they realized that their product is captive (Turcan, 2012) to 
a niche that “is very small, with maximum penetration we can get” – as Soft-Med CEO/co-owner 
explained. The quotes below exemplify the points just discussed: 
“In addition to project-based software development, we were also trying to specialize on 
various technology platforms and this experiment lasted something like 6 or 9 months 
and after that we saw that there is a need to focus: let’s focus on one thing, build one big 
development unit and grow it to the size we want” – Soft-Kode CEO/co-owner. 
“The product we currently have is not a breakthrough product – it deals with the 
problem, but does not cure. We aim to have a product that will cure as well, for example, 
cardio-vascular system. History will be when we really break in cure business” – Soft-
Med CEO/co-owner. 
Once an agreement is reached on which opportunity to pursue, entrepreneurs switch their 
attention to strategic and functional areas of their ventures (Lichtenstein et al., 2006) and 
improvise with opportunity execution (Bingham, 2009). It was interesting to observe that sales and 
marketing were not entrepreneurs’ primary concerns in this improvisation process; they were 
rather concerned and hence experimenting with R&D and product development processes (this 
might not be surprising given their engineering backgrounds). During this type of experimentation 
or improvisation with opportunity execution, entrepreneurs acquire dynamic capabilities that 
contribute to the attainment of a made-it point – be this an efficient product development process 
or an effective product launch.    
“[To develop internal quality product development process] was a non-stop process as 
the company grew, as it was necessary to focus on quality, and process issues all the 
time. I think it was 2008 when I realized that the system that was put in place worked” – 
Soft-Kode CEO/co-owner.  
“We started our sales quite early with a product that was very ugly by design – very 
rough, ugly prototype. In 2010, we sold 2500 units without making any marketing. The 
number of people who wanted to buy our product was increasing, even if you could not 
deliver it” - Soft-Med CEO/co-owner. 
One of the main differences we observed between these two ventures in this improvisation 
process (opportunity execution) was that Soft-Kode was experimenting to seek efficiency, whereas 
Soft-Med – to seek efficacy. We term these two types of experimentation as efficiency-seeking 
and efficacy-seeking and argue that each type requires specific dynamic-capabilities: efficiency-
seeking and efficacy-seeking. The above also suggests that there is difference in timing of 
efficiency-seeking experimentation and efficacy-seeking experimentation.  
Further in our data analysis we observed that the process of experimentation or improvisation 
is moderated by the availability of funding, with contradicting sings of the relationship. In the case 
of Soft-Med, less funding available led to less improvisation with the opportunity selection and 
more improvisation with opportunity execution. In the case of Soft-Kode the opposite was 
observed: less funding led to more improvisation with opportunity selection and less 
improvisation with opportunity execution, as respective entrepreneurs explained:  
“Less money you have you are hibernating, you have much more time to think about 
[your product] – you cannot do wrong things when you have less money. If we had more 
money, our concept would have been messier – maybe making mobile phone 
applications, etc. – or something else that would have hindered the process. Now we have 
to make it very raw, very simple and only one feature product” – Soft-Med CEO/owner.  
“We got busy with other projects…We never started lifting the company – we need a little 
bit of hard working to lift it up. We can make it a profitable business” – Soft-Kode 
CEO/owner. 
Legitimacy Lies  
Our analysis reveals that entrepreneurs may mitigate their ventures’ liabilities of newness, 
smallness and foreignness (Stinchcombe, 1965; Zaheer, 1995; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002) by 
telling legitimacy lies – another value-creating strategy. As a theoretical code, we defined 
legitimacy lies as “…intentional misrepresentations of the facts” (Rutherford, Buller & Stebbins, 
2009, p. 950). For example, Soft-Kode founders were taking orders from customers when they did 
not have a proper product development process in place. As one of the co-owners explained that 
“we tried to hide ourselves and avoid proactive sales and marketing”. At the same time, in order 
to get orders from large companies, like Nokia, their venture had to be of certain size: no less than 
50 employees. At one point, in order to get a large contract from a large company (as early 
customer), Soft-Kode had to demonstrate that it employed at least 50 employees, as explained by 
the CEO/co-owner:  
“We were told that we need to have a 50 guys company, and only then we might get large 
projects from the large companies. That was our first level. At the end of 2008, beginning 
of 2009 we achieved this number - near 50 guys as we had to calculate all taxi drivers, 
and cleaning ladies – to look big” – Soft-Kode CEO/co-owner. 
“When we reached 50 guys, something happened - we started getting good deals, large 
projects and better customers. Since then, we were getting more and more customers all 
the time” – Soft-Kode co-owner.  
Legitimacy-lie – as a subjective construct – is indeed in the eye of the beholder. Some of Soft-
Made’s stakeholders believed its products were not based on science and thus did not cure what 
they claimed to cure. This perception was mainly due to the unorthodox business model (for the 
medical sector) that Soft-Made adopted by selling their products directly to customers rather than 
via doctors and clinics. As a result, Soft-Made’s medical experiments and results were questioned, 
and Soft-Med ran into resistance and negative publicity in national mass media. The quotes below 
illustrate the above struggle:    
“There are big pharmacy companies – they make look everything too scientific. But there 
is an alternative way – selling products over the counter straight to customers. Tricky 
problems with various magazines are inevitable when you break the rules” – Soft-Med 
CEO/co-owner. 
“Soft-Med’s supporting evidence was made by non-medical outsiders, lacked basic 
research, with no single article ever written about the topic. Soft-Med had to make their 
products look like something scientific” – from mass-media publications. 
Made-it or Not 
Whether or not entrepreneurs and/or their ventures made-it is a matter of perception. The data 
point to two levels at which made-it concept applies: entrepreneurial level and venture level. At 
the personal level, entrepreneurs mentioned their own made-it point, highlighting their own 
learning experience as well as own financial performance: 
“I have my own personal made-it point and I think I have achieved it. I have learned so 
much from this experience that is much better than any MBA course that you can take in 
any university… I do not consider myself as green anymore” – Soft-Kode co-owner. 
“Indeed, I fulfilled my personal goal. My aim wasn’t to gain millions… Soft-Med product 
for me wasn’t very technically challenging product, and contributed to the launch of a 
new product to the market” – Soft-Med co-owner.  
When asked whether their ventures made-it, entrepreneurs did not see their ventures achieving 
steady states:   
“I was just thinking that probably we have not graduated yet – we did not stop being a 
startup; still entrepreneurial rather a professional company. Hopefully the made-it point 
is still to come; hopefully it is in the near future when we for example re-internationalize, 
and acquire professional management” – Soft-Kode co-owner. 
“We have not made it – there is scientific resistance – mainly coming from amateur 
scientists – and you have to deal with them the best way you can – that is one of the 
reasons why I do not believe we have made it or are near the turning point” – Soft-Med 
CEO/co-owner. 
Nonetheless, several relatively concrete made-it points emerged along organizational, 
business model, and operational dimensions of organizational gestalt, e.g., getting professional 
management, establishing optimal organizational structure, getting better projects from large 
customers, making profits and growing in number of employees (see Table 1), taking control over 
the whole product development process; developing own quality product development procedures; 
launching and selling the product; and getting VC funding, as the following quotes exemplify: 
“Our new customer partnership-building program has 3 levels. We start with 
subcontracting, done by senior developers in Finland. Next step is to start building own 
development and move part of the work to Bangladesh. And finally everything moves to 
us, where there is no more subcontracting – we are actually product manager for that 
company” – Soft-Kode CEO/co-owner.  
“In the winter of 2008-2009 we were doing our clinical trial and receiving our first 
results was a turning point for us... Another turning point for us was to get venture 
capital. In 2010, we sold our first 2500 units: that was a turning point for us as well” – 
Soft-Med CEO/co-owner. 
DISCUSSION 
In this paper we set to explore how and whether INVs made-it beyond their start-up phase or 
initial internationalization. To address these questions we focused our attention on value-creating 
strategies entrepreneurs pursue to get their ventures pass a threshold level of practiced activity – 
made-it point. We find entrepreneurs experiment (Zahra, 2005) with and reconfigure their venture 
at several levels: organizational, business model and operational in order to reach a threshold level 
of practiced activity (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Zahra & Filatotchev, 2004). We further find that 
entrepreneurs’ experimentation efforts are fueled by tensions that exist at these three levels of the 
organizational gestalt. We also find that during this experimentation process, entrepreneurs may 
tell legitimacy lies to legitimate their ventures in the eyes of their stakeholders. 
At the organizational level, entrepreneurs’ primary concerns were to reach an optimal 
ownership structure of the venture, given the nature of the opportunity pursued. At the business 
model level, entrepreneurs struggled to identify his/her venture’s business proposition to the 
market. At the operational level, entrepreneurs’ major concerns were to ensure the quality of 
processes and operations within the venture. We observed that these tensions or concerns were 
persistent at each level, though for different periods of time. For example, at the operational level 
the tensions eased faster probably due to the existence of substantive capabilities such as 
experience and knowledge in project-based software development, R&D and prototyping, and 
product development, which in turn made it possible to acquire dynamic capabilities much faster. 
At the other two levels, the tensions were persistent over longer period due to the lack of 
substantive capabilities and/or capacity to acquire respective substantive capabilities. This 
deficiency we maintain in turn creates a barrier in acquiring much needed dynamic capabilities to 
get the venture to a made-it point.  
   To mitigate the above tensions, entrepreneurs experiment or improvise with the dimensions 
of organizational gestalt at various levels to reach a threshold of entrepreneurial activity – made-it 
point. Entrepreneurs improvise with opportunity selection and opportunity execution (Bingham, 
2009). We find that entrepreneurs may improvise with all identified opportunities concurrently or 
may start improvising with new opportunity after realizing the initial opportunity identified and 
pursued did not turn out to be a real one. Once an agreement is reached on which opportunity to 
pursue, entrepreneurs switch their attention to strategic and functional areas of their ventures 
(Lichtenstein et al., 2006) and improvise with opportunity execution (Bingham, 2009). We find 
that entrepreneurs improvise with opportunity execution to seek efficiency or efficacy and observe 
that in order for this type of improvisation to be successful, entrepreneurs need to acquire 
respective dynamic capabilities: efficiency-seeking and efficacy-seeking dynamic capabilities. We 
maintain that entrepreneurs who seek efficacy will tend to improvise with opportunity selection 
consecutively, while those seeking efficiency will tend to improvise with opportunity selection 
simultaneously. We further maintain that respective dynamic capabilities will be acquired faster 
when seeking efficacy making it possible to reach a made-it point faster as well.  
How dynamic capabilities come into existence is an enduring question (Zahra et al., 2006) 
and although this question was not the focus of our study, from our data we may infer that 
experimentation (improvisation) mediates between the exploitation and transformation of 
substantive capabilities and the acquisition and creation of dynamic capabilities. The plausibility 
of this conjecture shall be investigated in future studies, preferably in ethnographic research 
settings to capture the phenomenon in real time rather than post-hoc (Zahra et al., 2006). Further 
in our data we find that the process of experimentation (improvisation) is moderated by 
availability of (financial) resources. Future research is needed to identify the sign of this 
relationship since our findings are contradictory. In one case we find that less available resources 
lead to less improvisation with the opportunity selection and more improvisation with opportunity 
execution. In another, the opposite is observed: less available resources lead to more improvisation 
with opportunity selection and less improvisation with opportunity execution. 
Legitimacy lies (Rutherford et al. 2009) emerged as another type of dynamic capability. We 
maintain that entrepreneurs tell legitimacy lies to compensate for the lack or inadequate quality of 
substantive capabilities. We view telling legitimacy lies as part of impression management that 
“…refers to the process by which individuals attempt to control the impressions others form of 
them” (Leary & Kowalski, 1990, p. 34). Employing this type of dynamic capability, entrepreneurs 
aim to gain legitimacy for their ventures faster (see e.g., Turcan, 2013), moving their ventures 
faster towards a steady state – made-it point. On the other hand, being a subjective construct, 
legitimacy lies may produce the opposite, negative effect whereby ventures’ stakeholders may 
view or perceive such activities illegitimate (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992) that clash with social norms 
or organizational goals (Scott, 1987).    
We are cautious when it comes to discuss whether INVs made-it or not by creating and 
exploiting various substantive and dynamic capabilities. Here we side with Zahra et al. (2006), 
who warns that in post-hoc studies such as this one, it is difficult to separate the existence of 
dynamic capabilities from their effects. Indeed, despite a number of made-it points, we find that 
the transition from entrepreneurial to professional run organization did not take place (Mintzberg, 
1973). This could be explained by the fact that entrepreneurs managed to develop substantive 
capabilities to produce desired outputs at various levels within the venture, including personal 
levels. However, they failed to create dynamic capabilities in order to change and reconfigure 
existing substantive capabilities and eventually establish a dominant logic (Prahalad & Bettis, 
1986) in the new venture during the emergence stage.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The central aim of this paper was to explore how and whether INVs made-it beyond their 
emergence phase. Given the instrument we employed to explore these questions, our results are 
limited in scope. However, we put forward a number of questions and conjectures to guide future 
research in this, currently under-researched area of international entrepreneurship (Zahra, 2005; 
Sapienza et al., 2006; Bingham, 2009; Sleuwaegen & Onkelinx, 2014). Understanding whether 
and how INVs reach their made-it points would contribute to our understanding of how early 
internationalization affect organizational survival and growth. 
CONTACT: Romeo V. Turcan; rvt@business.aau.dk; (T): +45 99408315; Department of 
Business and Management, Aalborg University, Fibigerstraede 10, DK-9220, Aalborg, Denmark. 
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Appendix 1: Soft-Kode critical event chart 
 
 
 
 
 
Year QI QII QIII QIV 
2004 The founder moved to 
Bangladesh 
Set-up Soft-Tech 
Software development 
unit in Bangladesh was 
established (not owned 
by Soft-Tech) 
  
2005 Opportunity: “at that 
time everyone was doing 
project based software 
development” 
Two market 
opportunities have been 
identified: 
- Software development 
- 3D modeling 
Future co-founder quit 
Nokia and joined forces 
with the founder 
The founder moved back 
to Finland 
Started Soft-Base 
(replacing Soft-Tech) 
 
  
2006 Soft-Vision became key 
customer for Soft-Base 
(later Soft-Kode) 
Tried to specialize on 
various technology 
platforms 
 
Established a 
development team in 
Vietnam 
A partner in Bangladesh 
did not continue its 
commitments 
A partner in Vietnam did 
not fulfill its 
commitments  
Decided “to control 
everything that is related 
to the process of software 
development” 
Decided to 
- create a holding 
- create own 
development units 
- to focus 
A clear division of 
businesses was 
emerging: software 
development and 3D 
modeling 
Became profitable 
2007 Soft-Base holding was 
created  
Started building own 
software unit in 
Bangladesh 
 
Business was divided 
into 2 areas: 
- Soft-Kode (project-
based software 
development) 
- 3D-Soft (3D 
modeling) 
New co-owner joins in 
 Grew up to 20 employees 
2008    Grew up to 50 
employees: “this was the 
level you need to have to 
get access to the large 
customers in Finland” 
2011    Reached: 
- 2.1 million euros in 
revenue 
- 100 employees 
- 30 customers/month 
2012  The aim is to grow up to 
a 250 employee venture 
  
 
Appendix 2: Soft-Med critical event chart 
 
Year QI QII QIII QIV 
2006   Product idea and  idea to 
start a business emerged 
Received seed funding 
from the Finish 
Innovation Institute 
Started prototype 
development  
First prototype ready 
First patent applied 
based on the prototype  
2007 Soft-Med was 
established 
Paid the patent by 
themselves (did not wait 
to get public funding) 
Finnish Patent Authority 
accepted the patent 
application 
Tested the prototype with 
friends who had [malady 
symptoms]  
Started to seek resources 
for clinical trials 
 Found qualified medical 
doctors to do clinical 
trials 
But were too late to test 
the product against 
[malady symptoms] for 
seasonal reasons 
2008  Received an offer from a 
psychologist who offered 
to do the clinical trials 
with reasonable price 
One of the founders 
became a full-time CEO 
Decided to focus on 
medical device business 
through mass-markets 
(B2C) rather than through 
clinics (B2B) 
Started clinical trials to 
study the response of the 
product against [malady 
symptoms] 
 
 
2009 First research results 
received 
Received positive results 
from clinical trials 
The other founder 
became full-time 
employee at Soft-Med 
Started the specifications 
of the product to 
understand  its dynamics 
and its opportunities  
Raised first ‘external’ 
funding from friends and 
family 
  
2010 Received clinical 
permission from EU 
Two private investors 
and one company 
invested in Soft-Med 
Launched first product to 
the Finnish market 
Opened a web-store 
Hired first fulltime 
employees 
New CMO hired  
Signed 1st sales contracts 
 2500 items sold mainly 
in Finland as a sign of 
customer need 
Got main VC investor 
who brought 0.4 million 
euros  
2011 Investor become part of 
the management team 
CMO became CEO 
The two original 
founders stepped down 
from management and 
focused solely on R&D 
Published two clinical 
trials in [malady 
symptoms] 
Signed delivery contract 
with health and welfare 
retail chain 
  
2012 New professional CEO 
was appointed by board  
  Received funding from 
the Finnish Funding 
Agency for Innovation 
2013 One of the original 
founders leaves 
Received next  round of 
funding: 7.4 mln euros  
Launched the second 
generation product  
 
 
Table 1: Growth data of case companies 
 
 
  2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Sof-Kode Revenue (€, 000) 1004 1192 1071 2103 2438 
 Profit (€, 000) 80 25 11 -69 -34 
 Employees 14 46 28 30 31 
Soft-Med Revenue (€, 000) 15 7 495 1429 1941 
 Profit (€, 000) -4 -89 -571 -602 -289 
 Employees 0 3 12 20 17 
 
